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Monetary Policy Transmission in Vector Autoregressions: 
A New Approach Using Central Bank Communication 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we study the role central bank communication plays in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. We employ the Swiss Economic Institute’s Monetary Policy 
Communicator to measure the future stance of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy. 
Our results indicate that, first, communication exerts a large influence on prices but also plays 
a noticeable role in the transmission of monetary policy to output. Second, communication 
partly crowds out the effects of the short-term interest rate as the latter’s influence is lower 
and its outside lag increases compared to a benchmark model without central bank 
communication. Future work on monetary policy transmission should incorporate both a 
short-term interest rate and a communication indicator. 
 
Keywords: Central Bank Communication, European Central Bank, Monetary Policy Shocks, 
Monetary Policy Transmission, Vector Autoregression 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since Sims’s seminal paper (1980), transmission of monetary policy typically has been 
studied using a vector autoregression (VAR) approach. In general, contractive monetary 
policy is found to decrease output and price level, with a maximum impact occurring after a 
time lag of 12–24 months (see, e.g., literature surveys by Leeper et al., 1996; Christiano et al., 
1999). Several indicators of monetary policy stance have been tested over the past three 
decades: a monetary aggregate (Sims, 1980), an indicator based on minutes from meetings of 
the Federal Open Market Committee (Romer and Romer, 1989), non-borrowed reserves at the 
central bank (Eichenbaum, 1992), a surprise measure based on Federal funds futures (Faust et 
al., 2004), and the currently most widely accepted single indicator (Bernanke and Blinder, 
1992)—the short-term interest rate (Sims, 1992). 
Over the past 15 years, central bank communication has evolved as an important tool 
for central bankers. By providing regular information about its economic outlook and the 
future stance of monetary policy, a central bank can influence interest rate expectations.
1 
Forward-looking agents alter their expectations before the interest rate changes. As a 
consequence, we observe fewer unexpected changes in monetary policy (Blinder et al., 2008) 
and studying actual policy shocks could thus paint a less than complete picture of the 
monetary transmission mechanism. In particular, VAR models that neglect the role of 
communication might overestimate the length of the outside lag. 
To date, however, this subject has not been studied in the context of monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms,
2 even though studying the dynamics of the short-term interest rate, 
output, and prices after (gradual) changes in communication could be insightful.
3 This paper 
aims at filling this gap in the literature and employs the Swiss Economic Institute’s (KOF) 
Monetary Policy Communicator (MPC) as an additional variable measuring communication 
about the future course of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy. This 
indicator covers forward-looking information about risks to price stability in the ECB 
president’s statement after each interest rate decision (KOF, 2007) and provides a quantitative 
assessment of the ECB’s expected future interest rate plans. The indicator potentially helps 
explaining any transmission process before an actual interest rate move. 
                                                 
1 Theoretically, central bank communication matters (i) in the absence of a stationary economy or monetary 
policy rule or (ii) in the presence of non-rational expectations (Blinder et al., 2008). 
2 Note that Romer and Romer (1989) use central bank communication (minutes) to identify exogenous shocks in 
monetary policy. However, it is not clear why central bank communication should be treated as exogenous from 
macroeconomic developments or the short-term interest rate (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998). Therefore, this paper 
treats communication in post-meeting statements as additional endogenous variable. 
3 As shown later in this paper, communication does capture information about monetary policy beyond the 3-
month interest rate. 4 
Our sample period begins at the inception of the ECB in January 1999 and ends in 
June 2011 (150 monthly observations). Econometrically, we use VAR models to address the 
following research question: Does central bank communication play any role in the 
transmission of ECB monetary policy to output and prices? Our prior is that communication 
leads short-term interest rates and that both variables jointly influence output and prices. 
 
2. Data and Econometric Methodology 
We utilize two variables to measure the monetary policy stance. In addition to the ‘classical’ 
3-Month Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor) we employ the KOF MPC. This indicator is 
based on a quantification of statements made by the ECB President at monthly press 
conferences.
4 As the ECB’s primary objective is to maintain price stability over the medium 
term, the indicator is based on statements which reveal the Governing Council’s assessment 
of developments which directly affect future price stability. It is constructed by balancing 
statements implying either (i) upside risks or (ii) downside risks to price stability against all 
statements on the topic of future price stability (KOF, 2007).
5  Therefore, changes in this 
indicator can be interpreted as changes in the ECB’s inflation expectations. Conrad and Lamla 
(2010) show that the EUR/USD exchange rate responds to ECB communication measured by 
the KOF MPC. Sturm and de Haan (2011) find this indicator useful in predicting the ECB’s 
next policy decision—even when the interbank rate is included in a Taylor (1993) rule model. 
Thus, this indicator appropriately captures ECB communication and is of relevance to 
financial agents. Figure 1 plots the 3-Month Euribor and the KOF MPC. 
Although the KOF MPC does anticipate changes in the future target by two to three 
months (KOF, 2007), the correlation to the interbank rate—which should capture expectations 
about the future target rate over the next three months—is only 0.41 over our sample period. 
Communication does capture information in monetary policy beyond the 3-month interest rate 
and, as a consequence, by including ECB communication in our model we may gain some 
further insight into monetary policy transmission. 
Econometrically, we employ a VAR model as pioneered by Sims (1980). In the 
benchmark case without central bank communication, we estimate the four-variable model, 
 1       ∑   
 
             , 
where    is a 4x1 vector of endogenous variables containing the industrial production index 
(IP), the harmonised index of consumer prices (CPI), and monetary aggregate M3 (in logs, 
                                                 
4 Coding of the statements is provided by Media Tenor, a media research institute (http://www.mediatenor.de). 
5 Further information on the KOF MPC is provided here: http://www.kof.ethz.ch/en/indicators/monetary-policy-
communicator. 5 
respectively), as well as the 3-month Euribor interest rate.
6 All variables enter the system as 
level variables (Sims and Uhlig, 1991) with three lags.
7 To study the dynamic impact of 
monetary policy on prices and output, we simulate their reaction to shocks in the short-term 
interest rate. These impulse response functions are obtained using the Cholesky 
decomposition. Following the idea of Taylor (1993), we expect the ECB to react on shocks in 
output and prices. Accordingly, the Cholesky ordering in the benchmark model is as follows: 
IP, CPI, 3 Month Euribor, M3. However, given the emphasis of money in the ECB strategy, 
we provide a robustness test where the ECB reaction function also includes the monetary 
aggregate (Cholesky ordering: IP, CPI, M3, 3 Month Euribor; see Figure A1).  
 
Figure 1: 3-Month Euribor and KOF MPC 
Source: ECB and KOF. 
 
In a second step, we add the KOF MPC to the vector of endogenous variables to test 
for its (additional) influence on the monetary policy transmission process.
8 We simulate the 
reaction of prices and output to shocks in the short-term interest rate and the KOF MOC. The 
ECB systematically uses communication to prepare for upcoming interest rate decisions 
(Sturm and de Haan, 2011). Therefore, the Cholesky ordering in the augmented case is as 
                                                 
6 Data source: ECB. As part of our robustness tests, we considered other variables in the VAR setup: EUR/USD 
exchange rate, euro nominal effective exchange rate, U.S. short-term interest rate, and price indicators for 
commodities, housing, and oil. The results presented in Section 3 of the paper are robust to the inclusion of these 
variables. To optimise the degrees of freedom in our estimations, we stick with the parsimonious specification. 
All omitted results are available on request. 
7  Out of a battery of lag-length selection criteria (sequential modified likelihood ratio test statistic, final 
prediction error, Akaike information criterion, Schwarz information criterion, Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion), we choose the lag length favoured by the majority of criteria. 
8 Note that the correlation between the 3 Month Euribor residuals in the four-variable VAR and the KOF MPC is 
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follows: IP, CPI, KOF MPC, 3 Month Euribor, M3. Figures A2a–A2c in the Appendix 
provide robustness tests for a different ordering of the KOF MPC and the 3M Euribor in the 




Figure 2 shows the impulse responses for the benchmark model that includes the short-term 
interest rate, but no central bank communication variable. Error bands show one and two 
standard error (SE) deviations in each direction. A Cholesky one standard deviation (SD) 
shock in the short-term interest rate (14 basis points, bps) leads to a significant decrease in the 
price index after 9 months (after 15 months based on two SE bands). The maximum impact is 
found after 47 months: a hypothetical 25 bps hike lowers the price level by 30 bps. Industrial 
production is affected in a similar way. After seven months (9 months if using two SE bands), 
output decreases significantly; the maximum drop of 137 bps after a 25 bps shock manifests 
after 19 months. The results are in line with findings from the early years of the European 
Monetary Union (see, e.g., van Els et al., 2003; Mojon and Peersman, 2003; Peersman and 
Smets, 2003; Angeloni et al., 2003). ECB monetary policy affects prices and output 
significantly, and after a considerable outside lag.
9  The results are robust to a different 
Cholesky ordering (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). 
 
Figure 2: Benchmark Case—Impulse Responses  
Note: The figure shows selected impulse responses to Cholesky one SD innovation in the 3-month Euribor. 
Cholesky decomposition is based on the ordering: IP, CPI, 3 Month Euribor, M3. Error bands are one and two 
standard error deviations. Full set of 16 impulse responses is available on request. 
                                                 
9 Other impulse responses (not shown here) are in line with a priori expectations. The short-term interest rate 
reacts positively to CPI and IP shocks, implying that the ECB is following a Taylor (1993) rule, and to M3 
shocks (with a short time lag); CPI (with a short time lag) and IP increase after M3 shocks; finally, we have 
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Response of IP to 3M Euribor7 
In a next step, we examine whether central bank communication plays any role in the 
transmission of ECB monetary policy to output and prices. We add the KOF MPC to the 
benchmark model and, first, explore the joint dynamics of both monetary policy indicators. 
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses for both variables. Error bands show one and two 
standard error (SE) deviations in each direction. A Cholesky one SD shock in the KOF MPC 
(13 bps) leads to a significant increase in the short-term interest rate, with a maximum impact 
of 8 bps after five months. Changes discussed in communications precede changes in the 
short-term interest rate by about nine months, which implies that the ECB systematically uses 
communication to prepare the financial world for its upcoming interest rate policy. In 
contrast, a shock in the 3-month Euribor (14 bps), that is, an unexpected change in monetary 
policy, has no significant impact on communication during the first seven months. However, 
after making an interest hike for which it provided no preparation, the central bank corrects its 
communication about future monetary policy significantly downward after eight months (11 
month when using 2 SE bands). 
 
Figure 3: Augmented Case—Joint Dynamics of 3-Month Euribor and KOF MPC 
Note: The figure shows selected impulse responses to Cholesky one SD innovation in the 3-month Euribor and 
the KOF MPC. Cholesky decomposition is based on the ordering: IP, CPI, KOF MPC, 3 Month Euribor, M3. 
Error bands are one and two standard error deviations. Full set of 25 impulse responses is available on request. 
 
In a next step, we analyse how prices and output react to both monetary policy 
indicators. The impulse responses are shown in Figure 4. Communication about future 
monetary policy influences CPI and IP. It significantly lowers prices after four months (12 
months when using two SE bands) and exerts a lasting effect on the price level, with the 
maximum impact occurring after 48 months. To provide a quantitative figure, we translate the 
Cholesky one SD shock in communication into a change in communication that leads to an 
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Response of 3M Euribor to KOF MPC8 
maximum of 58 bps. Communication partly crowds out the effects of monetary policy shocks 
in the augmented setup: the influence of the 3-month Euribor becomes significantly negative 
after 14 months (using one SE bands), which marks an increase in the outside lag. 
Furthermore, the maximum impact of a 25 bps hike in the short-term interest rate is lower (21 
bps) than without central bank communication (30 bps). Industrial production’s reaction to 
communication again takes place with a marginally shorter time lag than for the 3-month 
Euribor (7 months vs. 8 months, one SE bands). The maximum contraction of output is found 
after 20 months (165 bps for the equivalent of a 25 bps hike) in the case of communication. 
An actual interest rate hike of 25 bps reduces the IP index by 106 bps after 19 months.
10 
 
Figure 4: Augmented Case—Impulse Responses 
Note: The figure shows selected impulse responses to Cholesky one SD innovation in the 3-month Euribor and 
the KOF MPC. Cholesky decomposition is based on the ordering: IP, CPI, KOF MPC, 3 Month Euribor, M3. 
Error bands are one and two standard error deviations. Full set of 25 impulse responses is available on request. 
                                                 
10 Other impulse responses (not shown here) are in line with a priori expectations. The short-term interest rate 
and the KOF MPC react positively to CPI and IP shocks, implying that the ECB is following a Taylor (1993) 
rule in monetary policy actions and communications, and to M3 shocks (with a short time lag); CPI (with a short 
time lag) and IP increase after M3 shocks; finally, we have evidence for the liquidity effect as M3 goes down 
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Response of IP to KOF MPC9 
To get a more complete picture of the role of communication in the monetary 
transmission process, we decompose the variance of CPI and IP (see Figure 5). Confirming 
the impression from Figure 4, communication is explaining more variation in the CPI (38 
percent) than does the short-term interest rate (12 percent). In contrast, the share of explained 
variation in output is basically the same for both variables (17 percent). Thus, communication 
is particularly important for prices but also plays a noticeable role in the transmission of 
monetary policy to output. 
 
Figure 5: Augmented Case—Variance Decomposition 
Note: The figure shows the share of variation in IP and CPI explained by the 3 Month Euribor and the KOF 
MPC. Cholesky decomposition is based on the ordering: IP, CPI, KOF MPC, 3 Month Euribor, M3.  
 
Communication successfully manages expectations about future interest rates. By 
engaging in communication, the ECB can steer inflation and output before an actual interest 
rate change take place.
 However, a VAR model using communication as the sole indicator of 
monetary policy performs much worse than our benchmark model (results not shown). The 
reaction of prices and output shows the correct sign, but is not statistically significant. Thus, 
communication is a complement to the short-term interest rate in monetary policy 
transmission. 
Our results are robust to different Cholesky orderings (see Figures A2a–A2c in the 
Appendix) and employing the main refinancing rate instead of the 3-month Euribor (see 
Figure 3 in the Appendix). Furthermore, the short-term interest rate employed here is the 
average of daily interest rates during a particular month and also captures information after 
the ECB’s decision, which usually takes place early in the month. In contrast, the KOF MPC 
includes information only up to this decision day and, thus, the timing aspect is not favouring 
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4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the influence of central bank communication in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism using a VAR model. We employ the Swiss Economic Institute’s 
Monetary Policy Communicator as a variable (along with the short-term interest rate) 
measuring the European Central Bank’s future monetary policy stance. Our sample covers the 
period January 1999–June 2011. 
First, communication about future monetary policy influences CPI and IP more than 
does the actual short-term interest rate. Communication implying a future interest hike of 25 
bps decreases the price level significantly after four months and by a maximum of 58 bps 
after 48 months. Industrial production is significantly reduced after seven months, with a 
maximum impact of 165 bps after 20 months. In contrast, a 25 bps shock in the short-term 
interest rate lowers prices (output) significantly after 14 (10) months, with a maximum impact 
of 21 (106) bps after 48 (19) months. 
Second, communication partly crowds out the effects of monetary policy shocks; the 
influence of the short-term interest rate is lower and the time lag longer (in particular for 
inflation) in a model containing central bank communication than in a benchmark model 
without it. Furthermore, communication is explaining more variation in the CPI (38 percent) 
than does the short-term interest rate (12 percent). In contrast, the share of explained variation 
in output is basically the same for both variables (17 percent). Thus, communication is 
particularly important for prices but also plays a noticeable role in the transmission of 
monetary policy to output. However, a VAR model using communication as the sole indicator 
of monetary policy performs much worse than the benchmark model. Thus, communication 
complements the short-term interest rate in the process of monetary policy transmission. 
Our results indicate that prices and output react to a change in the inclination of future 
monetary policy more than to actual shocks in the target rate. Systematic central bank 
communication—as engaged in by the ECB—successfully manages expectations about future 
interest rates. Changes in communication precede changes in the short-term interest rate by 
about nine months. Thus, by using this channel of monetary policy, the ECB can steer 
inflation and output before actual interest rate changes take place.
 
We show that studying monetary policy transmission mechanisms these days needs to 
involve more than just analysing rare shocks in the short-term interest rate. Future work on 
monetary policy transmission should take note of our findings and employ an indicator for 
central bank communication. An assessment of communication by the Federal Reserve in this 
context would be a fruitful avenue for future research. Facing the zero lower bound of interest 11 
rates, the Federal Reserve uses communication to keep expectations of the future target rates 
low.
11 Employing the traditional short-term interest rate as the single indicator would fail to 
represent this ‘easing’ bias. 
   
                                                 
11 ‘The Committee currently anticipates that economic conditions … are likely to warrant exceptionally low 
levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013’ (Federal Open Market Committee, 2011). 12 
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Appendix 
Figure A1: Benchmark Case—Impulse Responses Based on Different Cholesky Ordering 
Note: The figure shows selected impulse responses to Cholesky one SD innovation in the 3-month Euribor. 
Cholesky decomposition is based on the ordering: IP, CPI, M3, 3 Month Euribor. Error bands are one and two 







0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48






0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
Response of IP to 3M Euribor15 
Figure A2a: Augmented Case—Impulse Responses Based on Different Cholesky Ordering 
Note: The figure shows selected impulse responses to Cholesky one SD innovation in the 3-month Euribor and 
the KOF MPC. Cholesky decomposition is based on the ordering: IP, CPI, 3 Month Euribor, KOF MPC, M3. 
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Response of IP to KOF MPC16 
Figure A2b: Augmented Case—Impulse Responses Based on Different Cholesky Ordering 
Note: The figure shows selected impulse responses to Cholesky one SD innovation in the 3-month Euribor and 
the KOF MPC. Cholesky decomposition is based on the ordering: IP, CPI, M3, KOF MPC, 3 Month Euribor. 
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Response of IP to KOF MPC17 
Figure A2c: Augmented Case—Impulse Responses Based on Different Cholesky Ordering 
Note: The figure shows selected impulse responses to Cholesky one SD innovation in the 3-month Euribor and 
the KOF MPC. Cholesky decomposition is based on the ordering: IP, CPI, M3, 3 Month Euribor, KOF MPC. 
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Response of IP to KOF MPC18 
Figure A3: Augmented Case—Impulse Responses Using the Main Refinancing Rate 
Note: The figure shows selected impulse responses to Cholesky one SD innovation in the main refinancing rate 
(MRR) and the KOF MPC. Cholesky decomposition is based on the ordering: IP, CPI, M3, main refinancing 
rate, KOF MPC. Error bands are one and two standard error deviations. Full set of 25 impulse responses is 
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Response of IP to KOF MPC